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Abstract
Culture shapes individuals, but the measurement of cultural differences has proven a chal-
lenge. Traditional measures of cultural values focus on individual perceptions. We suggest
that values are established and maintained within social communities of proximate others,
such as the family and its social environment. Within such communities, values serve to
maintain collective harmony whilst preserving individual agency. From a social-dynamic
analysis of communities, we infer that community values of loyalty regulate individual com-
mitment, values of honor regulate norm compliance, and values of group hierarchy maintain
a division of labor. In addition, communities may regulate the ways in which individuals have
independent agency. A new scale to measure these values was validated in four studies
(N = 398, 112, 465 and 111) among Dutch (religious and non-religious), Turkish-Dutch, Suri-
namese and Turkish groups. Values and practices were measured at the level of the individ-
ual (‘What do you value?’) and at the level of the perceived community (‘What does your
community value?’). Results show that, unlike individual-level measures of individualism/
collectivism, this scale has excellent reliability, differentiates between cultural groups, and
has predictive validity for future (voting) behavior. This approach provides a new way of con-
ceptualizing culture, a new measure of collectivism and new insights into the role of proxi-
mate others in shaping culture.
Introduction
Cultural differences are undeniable: people from different cultural backgrounds act differently
in a wide range of situations. But it is surprisingly difficult to pinpoint the source of these cul-
tural differences and to measure their underlying causes in cognition and behavior. One rea-
son why existing scales produce mixed results is that cultural difference is often assessed by
assuming that “culture” at high level of aggregation (e.g., nations or “east vs. west”), shapes val-
ues of individuals. In this paper, we argue that measures of cultural values can be improved by
taking into account the more proximate social environment in which people “do” culture. This
social environment is often changeable and fluid, but the social relationships within it are rela-
tively stable. This means that within-community cultural behavior is constrained not just by
individual beliefs, but also by the (perceived) beliefs and actions of others in one’s cultural
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group [1], and in particular by those with whom one interacts frequently [2]. This also means
that the social dynamics within communities shape the cultural behavior within it, and thus
inform the content of the values that regulate within-community behavior.
Accordingly, this paper develops a social dynamic analysis of how values are established
and maintained within communities, which can inform how to measure cultural values. This
paper will argue that community collectivism is shaped by prevalent values and practices
within the community of proximate others. This community environment (rather than
abstract social categories such as nationality) should be the most proximate and primary
source of cultural differences. This social dynamic analysis also helps to identify the content of
the values most likely to be shaped within the community: the focus should be on values essen-
tial for regulating members’ community behavior (cf. [3]). Abiding by these values would be a
prerequisite not just for the community to live harmoniously, but also for the individual to fit
in and be accepted.
The current paper contains an outline of this conceptual analysis, and we develop a mea-
surement instrument from it. This is a measure of Community Collectivism that differs from
existing measures in the form of measurement: we measure personal values and practices (per-
sonal collectivism or PerCol for short) as well as perceived values and practices within the
community of proximate others (community collectivism, ComCol). This scale also differs in
its content by focusing on values and practices that are essential to regulating the social behav-
ior within the communities examined: issues of loyalty, honor, hierarchy and agency (Fig 1).
Four studies are presented that put PerCol and ComCol to the test, and suggest that ComCol
is distinctively effective.
Culture: What is it and what does it do?
Although it has proven virtually impossible to define culture [4], one dominant definition is
that cultures are ‘commonly shared meaning systems’ [5]. These meaning systems are typically
translated to values [6, 7], such as those captured by the World Values Survey [8]. Together
Fig 1. Structure of Community Collectivism.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0185725.g001
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with the Individualism-Collectivism (Ind/Col)-heuristic (e.g., [9]), such values are among the
most commonly used operationalizations of cultural differences. Although they are widely
used, existing measures of such values have also been criticized as ill defined (e.g., [10]) and as
being divorced from the social contexts within which individual thinking normally occurs
(e.g., [11, 12]).
One of the debates regarding the conceptualization and operationalization of culture hinges
on the question at what level culture and the values it is comprised of are supposed to be shared:
at a national level, or rather the individual and situational level, or something in between? In
defense of a national level approach, Hofstede & Bond [13] originally argued that distinctions
between cultures would only be useful when comparing nations (see also [14]). Intuitively, the
notion of national cultures rings true: in popular perception ‘national characters’ seem to exist.
But empirically, the evidence is not so clear-cut. Terracciano and colleagues [15] compared in-
group perceptions of national character with aggregated personality traits and concluded that
perceptions of national character are “unfounded stereotypes” ([15], p.3). Similarly, for most
‘cultural’ values the within-country consensus is much lower than one would expect if values
were indeed heavily influenced by culture and if cultures were a property of nations [10].
Fischer & Schwartz ([15], p.1137) conclude that “segments of the population emphasize differ-
ent values because they have different experiences”: large within-country differences exist.
Finally, it has been argued that cultural differences cannot be seen outside of the situational con-
text they take place in: culture is primed or even determined by context (e.g., [16]).
One possible resolution to this issue is to make a distinction between personal and intersub-
jective values [1]. This suggests that people assess and perceive reality based on their sociocul-
tural contexts: “rather than acting on their personal beliefs and values, people sometimes act
on the beliefs and values they perceive to be widespread in their culture” ([1], p.482, emphasis
added). These intersubjective perceptions of culture are likely to differentiate much better
between cultural groups, and may indeed be consequential. The empirical work in this tradi-
tion tends to measure cultural values by reference to abstract social categories (e.g., Japanese,
Poles, Americans) whose cognitive representations (like stereotypes) are likely to be
intersubjective.
Culture within communities
The National level may not be the only or best level at which intersubjective values should be
measured. We argue that culture is likely to be most strongly and most consistently influenced
by the community of concrete others with whom a person interacts on a day to day basis, such
as one’s (extended) family. The national group (e.g., Americans) is a depopulated cognitive
construct. Several studies have reported a ‘dissociation’ between personal and cultural values
measured at this level (e.g., [1, 17–19]). The community one lives in is more concrete and
known to the individual through personal experience. The community (e.g., family and
extended family) is populated by others of flesh and blood. When acting within this setting or
when expressing oneself, one has to take account of ongoing relationships and of their per-
ceived values as inferred from, for example, past actions and manifested beliefs.
It is most likely within communities such as these that values are shaped, as they are
requirements for coordinated social interaction, functioning and survival for groups [3,8].
Communities need particular mechanisms in order to regulate within-community behavior
and to ensure the future preservation and integrity of the community. These mechanisms
translate into values that are promoted within the community and that individual group mem-
bers are supposed to live by. The same mechanism may operate within Nations or larger col-
lectives, but their influence is likely to be much less direct.
Community Collectivism scale
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If we want to examine what these values are, exactly, and how they are promulgated within
the community, one could take different approaches. Like Schwartz’ Theory of Basic Individ-
ual Values, one could build a taxonomy of universal, personal values, some of which meet
community requirements, while others meet individual or biological needs. But one could also
take the community and the social dynamics within it as the starting point of such an analysis,
because groups also have certain universal features. This is the approach we adopt here.
Cultural values and their social dynamic origin
If we look for the fundamental features of groups that play a role in their formation and conti-
nuity, we may begin by distinguishing certain features of groups that appear to be universal in
the sense that they can be found in all groups (and indeed across many species of social animal).
All groups have a system of care, roles, and rules. By examining these systems and the social
dynamics that sustain them, we can begin to identify the content of the shared cultural values
that group members hold in common and that enable these systems to exist and function.
Care and communal cooperation: Community values of loyalty. Groups, especially
those that are defined by close bonds, display a sense of unity (also referred to as entitativity,
see [20]). From an evolutionary perspective, the propensity to form cooperative groups is seen
as crucial in the survival and thriving of early hominids [21], and the desire to function in
groups in order to be loved, valued and respected is considered an intrinsic property of
humans (e.g., [22–24]). It is therefore not surprising that humans form groups that serve more
than just instrumental goals: groups are the prime environment within which belonging and
value is established, within which support and love is exchanged, in which cooperation can be
expected. To enable this, groups should possess community values that encourage a certain
amount of loyalty towards the group from all its members.
At the same time, there are substantial cultural differences in the degree of (un)conditional-
ity and reciprocity of the loyalty that is expected within certain key groups such as the family
(e.g., [25–27]). In some cultures, groups such as the family provide limited care, love and sup-
port (for example because care is institutionalized, because love is provided in friendship net-
works or because support is provided by the welfare state). Also, there are (most likely)
substantial cross-cultural differences in the dimensions along which loyalty within particular
groups is expected and disloyalty tolerated [28]. Overall, one would expect more interdepen-
dent or collectivistic cultural settings to be characterized by stronger awareness of community
values that demand high levels of in-group loyalty. In other words, community values of loy-
alty should show distinct inter-cultural differences.
Roles and position: Community values of hierarchy. Another universal feature of
human groups (as well as most animal groups) is that they have a degree of hierarchy and a
division of roles. In strategic family therapy, for instance, a balanced and natural hierarchy
between parents and children is emphasized as a necessity [29]. Within small groups, members
enjoy having a clear division of roles which provide members with a sense of place and individ-
ual distinctiveness [30–32]. A 30-nation comparison of families by Georgas et al. [26] shows
that some form of structure is a universal characteristic and, crucially, that these hierarchical
structures are universally translated into (family) values. In sum, hierarchical structures appear
to enable the functioning of any group. Consequently, all groups have a distinct set of commu-
nity values pertaining to the hierarchical structure within the group that specify the responsi-
bilities and privileges of position, that regulate interactions between positions and the rules for
making the transition from one to the other.
Although the existence of hierarchies is ubiquitous, the way in which hierarchies are dis-
played and maintained appears to be quite variable between and within cultures. Some cultures
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have a distinctly “loose” approach to maintaining hierarchies in public settings, but in ‘tight’
countries (i.e. countries where norms are more strictly defined and there is little tolerance for
norm violation) it is more likely that one finds autocratic forms of rule and a generic expecta-
tion that seniority, a form of hierarchy, is respected [33] (see also [13,34]). In sum, whilst all
groups are characterized by some degree of internal organization or hierarchy, community val-
ues of hierarchy should show considerable inter-cultural differences.
Respect for rules and regulations: Community values of honor. Care and Roles can be
seen as rules for how to behave. But these do not exert influence without a system that ensures
rules are followed. It is often assumed that reward and punishment play a central role in this,
but in practice group members only resort to these in extreme cases [35]. We propose that
most of the time, the everyday behavior in communities is regulated by honor. All groups
develop a communal understanding of what is ‘honorable’ and what is not. Similarly, in all
groups, norm violation is shameful (even if it is not sanctioned, cf. [36]).
But even though norm violations are punishable in all groups and cultures, there is consid-
erable variation in the degree of tolerance and the severity of the punishment [37]. There are
also strong cultural differences in what counts as honorable and not. For example, Leung &
Cohen [11] distinguish cultures of dignity, of honor, and of face. IJzerman & Cohen [38] even
divide cultures into ‘honor cultures’ versus ‘nonhonor cultures’. Such cultural differences can
appear extreme when comparing the cultural values that underpin so-called ‘honor killings’
(e.g., [39]) with the sexual libertarian values of some modern Western subcultures. But even at
the so-called ‘nonhonor’ extreme, we find communities that promote the idea that it is virtu-
ous to be industrious and hardworking (e.g., [40]), and shameful to be idle and unemployed
(e.g., [41]). Thus, although the norms and sanctions may differ widely, we also see the same
mechanism at work: the group prescribes what is virtuous and what not.
In sum, we regard honor as a means of enforcement against norm violation, and we want to
disentangle this from the content of the virtues involved. Consequently, we distinguish cul-
tures by the degree to which norm violations are monitored, and the possible punishment
would threaten the status of individuals and/or the groups the norm violator belongs to.
Individuality: Having personal agency in a community. Values of Hierarchy, Honor
and Loyalty are the backbones of a community’s system of roles, rules and care. But a com-
munities’ members are also unique individuals with agency and a need for personal distinc-
tiveness. The agency of individuals is traditionally considered a key difference between
‘Eastern’ and ‘Western’ cultures (e.g., [42, 43]) and as such should provide another means of
discriminating between cultural groups. But there are good reasons why agency is qualitatively
different from community-based regulatory values. Hierarchy, Honor and Loyalty are mecha-
nisms that preserve relatedness [44–46]. By contrast agency preserves autonomy, a basic and
universal need of individuals (see also: [47]). Agency may also be one way to achieve distinc-
tiveness, which can be found as a motive to establishing identity in all cultures, albeit in very
different ways across individualistic and collectivistic ones [48, 49].
In sum, personal agency may be part of the values of a group or community and can be con-
sidered another means to differentiate between cultures. But there are also suggestions that
personal agency is an individual difference variable that is distinct from community-based
values.
Putting things together: Outlining a Community Collectivism Scale (CCS)
So far, we have identified four dimensions that are central to the social life of communities:
Loyalty, Honor, Hierarchy, and Agency are all prerequisites for the community to live harmo-
niously, for individuals to fit in and be accepted. In line with the intersubjective approach,
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these four should not just be assessed by the individual’s personal beliefs about them. It is also
important to know how community members perceive the beliefs and practices of others
within their community. It is especially these perceived communal values that should predict
culturally distinctive social behavior.
In constructing the scale, we had to ask ourselves what constitutes a ‘community’? There
are many different ways of interpreting this term (e.g., one’s neighborhood or village, one’s
peer group, etc.). Our conceptual approach looks at the influence of long-term relations on
individual values and actions. It is widely accepted that for most people the central hub of
socialization and the core relationships within which they anchor their values is the family
(e.g., [44, 50, 51]). Indeed, a recent study confirmed that across many cultures, including sup-
posedly individualistic ones, the most important group in people’s lives were nuclear and
extended family [52]. The family, in turn, is embedded in a network of families (e.g., at schools
or in neighborhoods) who reference each other (e.g., [46, 53]). Therefore, within the CCS, we
operationalized community as the core and extended family, within a wider network of fami-
lies seen as in-group.
It is important to be clear about how this approach departs from other methods of operatio-
nalizing cultural difference. CCS differs from the most often used measures of Individualism/
Collectivism such as INDCOL95 [9] and from the intersubjective approach in several ways.
First, CCS uniquely distinguishes social dynamics of loyalty, hierarchy, honor and agency.
Compared with INDCOL95, CCS distinguishes community and personal values. Compared
with the intersubjective approach, CCS is unique in its focus on the community rather than
higher-order groups such as the Nation.
It is also important to highlight differences with Schwartz’ values scale. Schwartz distin-
guishes motivational values that individual group members are supposed to live by. Accord-
ingly, the Schwartz Values Survey (SVS) asks respondents to rate values (e.g., honoring of
parents and elders; showing respect) for their importance “as a guiding principle in my life”.
Schwartz’ scale is thus, ultimately, a scale that minutely dissects all the values that individuals
can possibly possess. By comparison, the CCS is much more situated and focused on a specific
set of systemic characteristics of groups (hierarchy, norms, loyalty, agency). Although inevita-
bly there is some overlap in content between these four and Schwartz’s system of values (which
after all purports to catalogue all of them) there are marked and striking differences in
approach. CCS does not just aim to measure personal values: Community values are promul-
gated through practices and beliefs as well: what matters is how culture is done within the com-
munity. By contrast, Schwartz’ approach is most interested in how individuals see themselves.
In sum, we developed a 4-dimensional Community Collectivism Scale (CCS), assessing val-
ues of Loyalty, Hierarchy, Honor and Agency. Values were measured at the personal level (the
individual’s own views and practices) and the collective/communal level (the perceived views
and practices of others). We conducted four studies in order to: i) assess the scale’s methodo-
logical characteristics and validity, and determine the definitive version, ii) assess and confirm
the ability to discriminate between cultural groups, iii) assess the types of behaviors and atti-
tudes the scale can predict, and iv) assess how CCS related to existing measures. The results
are discussed in the following sections.
Method and results
Samples
We tested the CCS in four samples: Sample 1 consisted of 398 participants, of which were 183
of Turkish descent (44% women, Mage = 31), and 215 indigenous Dutch (46% women, Mage =
46), all inhabitants of the Netherlands and members of an online panel (PanelClix). We
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compared the cultural groups on demographical variables (age, sex, occupation and educa-
tion). Of the Turkish sample 25,7% were students, whereas only 3,7% of the indigenous
Dutch sample were. With the exception of age there were no further significant differences
(Mindigenous Dutch = 46); MTurkish = 31). Fourteen cases were considered multivariate outliers
(Mahalanobis distance, p< .001), and removed. Sample 2 were 112 PanelClix-members who
also participated in the first wave of data collection, of which 55 of Turkish descent (49%
women, Mage = 34), and 57 indigenous Dutch (49% women, Mage = 49).
Sample 3 were 465 Panelclix-members from four cultural groups (all inhabitants of the
Netherlands): (a) non-religious indigenous Dutch (n = 127, 47% women, Mage = 39), (b)
orthodox protestant indigenous Dutch (n = 124, 65% women, Mage = 39), (c) of Turkish
descent (n = 94, 53% women, Mage = 31) and (d) of Hindustani Surinamese descent (n = 120,
67% women, Mage = 37.5). We compared the cultural groups on demographical variables
(age, sex, occupation and education). Gender was not evenly distributed with the orthodox-
protestant Dutch (65% women) and Hindustani Surinamese (67% women) sub-samples.
The Turkish Dutch sample was less likely to have higher education than the other groups and
had a significantly lower mean age (Mnon-relig.Dutch = 39, Morth-prot.Dutch = 39, MHind.Sur. = 38,
MTurkish = 31). Eight cases were identified as multivariate outliers (Mahalanobis distance, p<
.001), and removed.
Finally, Sample 4 were inhabitants of Turkey who were part of a Qualtrics panel. Sample 4
(N = 111, 44% women, Mage = 39) participated in a two-wave study (first measurement March
2014, second October 2015).
Outline of the studies. Our goal was the construction and validation of a scale that gauges
cultural differences, and predicts differences in attitudes and behaviors. Construction and vali-
dation of CCS was conducted in the following stages: The first stage consisted of item genera-
tion based on our proposed structure (four dimensions at the community and personal level).
We then reduced the number of items for each hypothesized dimension, retaining the items
most suitable for further analysis (Sample 1). Subsequently, factor analysis across hypothesized
dimensions was conducted to ascertain factor structure at the personal and community level
(Samples 1 and 3), followed by bifactor analyses in order to explore whether our dimensions
are better explained by one underlying (cultural) factor (Sample 1). We then established
whether the definitive scale meets the basic criteria for measurement invariance. Also, we
determined validity by comparing CCS with existing scales (Samples 1 and 3), looking at
whether it differentiates between cultural groups (Samples 1, 2 and 3), whether it predicts atti-
tudes (toward family, kin and work, Sample 1) and behavioral orientations (measured via
behavioral scenarios across the different dimensions, Samples 1,2 and 3). Finally, to study the
predictive behavior of the scale for behavioral outcomes, we report results of a longitudinal
study in which participants complete the CCS at time 1, and report on recent behavior (voting,
social conflicts) at time 2, one and a half years later (Sample 4).
Choice of samples. The choice of sample was guided by the need to (a) differentiate
between cultural or subcultural groups that differ in Individualism-Collectivism whilst (b)
keeping the language within which the test was administered constant. Consistent with our
group dynamic approach, the idea that comunities shape values implies that culture and cul-
tural values can be distinguished within and not just between nations. We thus searched for
groups that all use the same language but have different community structures for cultural or
subcultural reasons.
In the first three studies, we compared different subcultural groups in the Netherlands
which meet these criteria. Indigenous Dutch culture is traditionally considered to be individu-
alistic (e.g., [54] Van Oudenhoven, 2001), and could therefore be contrasted with the culture
of a collectivist immigrant group in The Netherlands, the Turks (e.g., [55, 56]). Samples 1 and
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2 therefore compared these groups. Sample 3 was approached for a study that aimed to further
refine our scale, as well as establish whether it can also differentiate between (sub)cultural
groups. Sample 3 therefore also compared religious subcultures: secular Dutch versus strict-
protestant Dutch. This is important to establish that between-community differences need not
be ethnic in origin. Compared with secular Dutch, strict-protestants display a distinctly differ-
ent community structure (e.g., as evidenced by a birth ratio that is almost double the national
average, a tendency to live in close proximity to same-faith others in a specific “bible belt”
region of the country, strong community ties, etc.). Sample 3 also sought to generalize findings
from Turkish Dutch to Hindustani Surinamese Dutch. The Hindustani Surinamese are
migrants (and their descendants) from the former Dutch colonies of Surinam who originally
come from India; they are considered to be culturally collectivistic (e.g., [57]). A further advan-
tage of using Turkish and Hindustani (Surinamese) cultures as collectivist references, is the
fact that these cultures are often overlooked in the Ind/Col-research, where generally East-
Asian and Northern American cultures are contrasted. Sample 4, finally, consisted of inhabi-
tants of Turkey, all indigenous Turkish. Inhabitants of this country are interesting because of
the stark differences between modern secular Turkish communities and more traditionalist
ones; this allows us to test CCS’ ability to differentiate between communities within a culture.
Ethics statement. Participants were members of an online panel and were recruited by
the panel provider (Panelclix). All participants were of the age of 18 or older. This was checked
by both the panel provider and ourselves (via a question in the questionnaire). All participants
were asked their explicit consent to participate in filling out a questionnaire about social rela-
tions before they started our (online) questionnaire. It was also explicitly pointed out that they
could stop and cancel their participation at any time, and that their responses would be treated
confidentially. They could give or deny consent by either clicking the button that explicitly
stated they gave their consent, or the button that explicitly stated that they did not wish to con-
tinue. In the latter case, the questionnaire would be aborted immediately and the participant
would be thanked for their input. If the participant did consent, the questionnaire would com-
mence, and they were given disclosure about the intent of our research when finishing the
questionnaire. This whole procedure was submitted to and approved by the Ethical Committee
(Psychology) of the University of Groningen.
Results: Scale construction
How were items generated?
For each of the four hypothesized dimensions (Honor, Agency, Loyalty, Social Hierarchy),
approximately twelve items were construed that could be administered at the Community and
Personal level. Some items were adapted from existing scales such as the INDCOL95 [9] and
the World Values Survey [58]. We aimed to capture a broad spectrum of the facets of each
dimension. This procedure resulted in a total of 94 items (47 items mirrored on Community
and Personal levels) that were assessed on scales ranging from 1- (strongly disagree) to 5 -
(strongly agree). The resulting scale consisted of two separate blocks of Personal and Commu-
nity items. Community items were preceded by an explanation of the concept of community
saying: “Some of the statements that will be presented to you refer to your community. With
your community, we mean your core family, your extended family and other families (in your
environment) that matter to you”. The reference to “other families that matter to you” was
included so that participants would focus on the ingroup context of their families, and be less
likely to make contrastive social comparisons to families of the “outgroup”. We included a
check for participants to confirm that they had read and understood this.
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Which items were selected?
Item selection (Sample 1) was based on statistical considerations as well as item content, in
conjunction with theoretical considerations. We inspected inter-item and item-total correla-
tions as well as conducting exploratory factor analyses for each dimension separately [59, 60].
In order to maximize validity, we balanced the need for internal consistency with adequate
heterogeneity of item content. Redundant items (r> .8), as well as items whose item-total
correlation were too small (r< .4), were filtered out. Where the characteristics of items con-
flicted between the levels, priority was given to the Community subscales (i.e., an item loading
high on the personal but not community level would be eliminated). We conducted explor-
atory factor analyses for each dimension separately with Sample 1 [59, 60] and items with load-
ings lower than .4 were eliminated. As a last criterion, items with communalities < .3 were
removed. With this procedure, we retained three to four items per subscale. We aimed to
retain negatively as well as positively worded items, in order to check for and prevent acquies-
cence effects. However, none of the negatively worded items passed the criteria. As a result, we
retained 15 items mirrored at the Community and the Personal level (30 items in total) that
formed reliable subscales (Table 1).
What is the factor structure?
We aimed to ascertain the hypothesized four-dimensional structure, first with Sample 1, subse-
quently with Samples 2 and 3. Because we assume Community Collectivism to be a broad con-
struct we expected high factor loadings to be rare. Furthermore, because at the collective level
in particular the 4 dimensions would be interconnected we also expected some cross-loadings.
In other words, given the theoretically derived item generation and item selection strategy it
would be problematic to find a completely orthogonal factor structure. We performed explor-
atory factor analysis via Principal Axis Factoring (with Promax rotation) for the community
versus personal level separately. Note that this approach (subscales first, then superordinate
structure) is conservative with respect to our hypotheses. With regard to the community level
we determined the number of factors as four via a parallel analysis on the scree-plot [60] (Rus-
sel, 2002). These four factors corresponded well with the four hypothesized dimensions Hier-
archy, Loyalty, Honor and Agency (Table 1). We found only one substantial cross loading (i.e.
>.25) between dimensions, with SHC1 (Social Hierarchy Community level, item 1) loading
-.26 on the Loyalty dimension. Furthermore, the loading of item SHC2 (Social Hierarchy
Community level, item 2) was relatively high (.95).
At the personal level, we also extracted 4 factors. Again, the factor structure was as expected.
The order in which factors were extracted differed slightly from the Community level: Honor
was extracted first at this level as well, but Loyalty and Hierarchy changed places, while Agency
again was extracted last (see Table 1). The only substantial cross-loading was SHP1 (Social
Hierarchy Personal level, item 1), which cross-loaded (-.28) on the Loyalty dimension. In
order to confirm the factor structure, we also performed the factor analyses on Sample 3. The
factor structure that emerged for Sample 1, re-emerged on both levels.
Of the four dimensions, the Agency dimension was the weakest at both levels across both
samples. Thus, the concept of agency appears to be rather poorly defined as a distinct factor.
Moreover, the factors Hierarchy, Loyalty and Honor are more strongly mutually correlated,
than they are with Agency.
To further clarify the factor structure, we conducted a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA)
with Satorra-Bentler correction, using the Lavaan-package (0.5–15) for R [61] (Rosseel, 2012).
CFA of a four-factor model for the Community level indicated a good fit (corrected for 4 cross
loadings): χ2 (80) = 120.14, p = .002, CFI = .975, RMSEA = .036, and SRMR = .039. Fit of the
Community Collectivism scale
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0185725 September 28, 2017 9 / 29
Table 1. Community Collectivism Scale–selected items with factor loadings and scale reliability.
Level Dimension Item Subscale α Factors
Community 1 2 3 4
Honor .80
HC1: In my community it is considered a disgrace if there is gossip about you. .54
HC2: In my community, honor is the most important thing for people. .80
HC3: Our community monitors if people observe the unwritten rules. .60
HC4: In my community, members of the family feel responsible for preserving and
protecting another family member’s honor.
.84
Agency .67
AC1: In my community, you are responsible for the important choices in your life .76
AC2: In my community, everyone is responsible for their own life. .60
AC3: In my community striving for autonomy is considered good. .60
Loyalty .74
LC1: In my community people experience the problems of their family members as if they
were their own problems.
.45
LC2: In my community family ties are very strong. .65
LC3: People are expected to support their family members, even if they do not want to. .53




SHC1: In my community, it is generally believed that men have a more important voice than
women.
.61 -.26
SHC2: In my community, your elders’ opinions are more important than your own opinions
are.
.95
SHC3: In my community people believe that older people have a higher status than the
young.
.81
SHC4: In my community you are expected to accept that some people in your family have




HP1 I would consider it a disgrace if there would be gossip about me. .66
HP2: Honor is the most important thing for me. .73
HP3: I monitor if people (from my community) observe the unwritten rules. .62
HP4: I feel responsible for preserving and protecting my family member’s honor .71
Agency .72
AP1: I am responsible for the important choices in my life. .74
AP2: I am responsible for my own life. .85
AP3: I consider striving for autonomy as good. .54
Loyalty .73
LP1: I experience the problems of family members as if they were my own problems. .47
LP2: My ties with my family are very strong. .77
LP3: I would support my family members, even if I wouldn’t want to. .63
LP4: I will do what I can when a family member needs me. .60
Hierarchy .74
SHP1: I believe men should have a more important voice than women. -.28 .38
SHP2: My elders’ opinions are more important to me than my own opinions are. .79
SHP3: I think that older people have a higher status than the young. .86
SHP4: I accept that certain people in my family have more to say than others .46
Note: N = 393; Principal Axis Factoring with Promax-rotation: pattern matrix; Only factor loadings > .25 are shown, factor loadings > .40 are in boldface.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0185725.t001
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four-factor model at the Personal level was acceptable (corrected for 6 cross loadings): χ 2 (80) =
161.50, p< .001, CFI = .946, RMSEA = .052, and SRMR = 0.047.
Similar results were found in a confirmatory factor analysis for Sample 3: CFA of a four-
factor model for the Community level indicated a good fit (corrected for 4 cross loadings):
χ2(80) = 126.15, p = .001, CFI = .971, RMSEA = .038 and SRMR = .038. Fit for the four factor
model at the Personal level was again acceptable (corrected for 4 cross loadings): χ2 (80) =
152.90, p< .001, CFI = .950, RMSEA = .047 and SRMR = .047.
In sum, the findings are consistent with our hypothesized factor structure. Moreover, solu-
tions at the Community and Personal levels were somewhat different. This supports the dis-
tinction between cultural norms at the Community versus Personal level, underscoring the
necessity to measure these levels separately, especially in the case of the Honor, Loyalty and
Hierarchy dimensions, as the order of extraction may well reflect differences in the centrality
of these dimensions.
Bifactor analysis
We then assessed whether at the Community level, the variance in the sample is explained by a sin-
gle underlying (cultural) dimension, a Community factor that encompasses the dimensions of loy-
alty, hierarchy and honor. In order to do so we conducted bifactor analysis [62, 63] on Sample 1
using the Lavaan-package for R. We specified two models, a model with all four factors and a
model with only the three specific Community factors (Honor, Loyalty and Hierarchy). Both
models also specified a general factor predicted by all items. We applied the Schmid-Leiman
orthogonalization and thus assumed all factors to be uncorrelated [63]. Due to the ‘beta’ nature of
the Lavaan R-package (05–15), the forced orthogonalization of the factors did produce some
computational errors, which we managed to circumvent by fixing item HC2 on 0.3. This being the
most conservative solution, as it maximizes the amount of variance explained by the Honor factor.
The (confirmatory) bifactor analysis with Satorra-Bentler correction for the four-factor
model at the Community-level reveals a workable fit (specifying four cross-loadings): χ2(72) =
144.29, p< .001, CF = .954, RMSEA = .051 and SRMR = .053. However, a closer examination
of the factor loadings on the general factor (g) reveals that in contrast to the other three dimen-
sions there is little relation between g and the three Agency items (loadings varying between
-.14 and -.10). A three-factor model excluding Agency considerably improved the fit of the
model (corrected for three cross loadings): χ2(40) = 80.3, p< .001, CFI = .972, RMSEA = .051
and SRMR = .039. Importantly, this bifactor analysis allows us to assess the strength of the
underlying dimension (the general factor) relative to each individual component. The results
of this analysis are provided in Table 2. As can be seen, the general factor explains 56% of all
variance (for the three-factor model). Each component explains some additional variance,
ranging from 18% to 9%. This implies that there is merit in differentiating between Commu-
nity-level Hierarchy, Loyalty, and Honor, but that a general ‘Community’ level factor also
explains substantial variance across all three.
On the basis of these findings, we took the means of the scores of the Honor, Loyalty and
Hierarchy subscales for each level as general indexes of ComCol (Community Collectivism
score) and PerCol (Personal Collectivism score). Agency is most likely to be seen as a separate
factor, and is included in the analyses as such. The correlation matrix in Table 3 confirms this
assertion.
Measurement invariance
A basic premise for using a scale to compare groups, is the ability of the scale to measure the
construct regardless of group characteristics that are not relevant within that context [64–67].
Community Collectivism scale
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We analyzed our models (the four factor models separately for both levels) for the two groups
in Sample 1 (indigenous Dutch and Dutch of Turkish descent), to examine configural, metric
and scalar invariance. We did not consider full scalar invariance (also constraining means) as
the purpose of the scale is to measure differences between groups. Specifically, we tested the
Goodness of Fit indexes (CFI, χ2/df-ratio and RMSEA) when constraining the factor loadings
(metric invariance) and intercepts (scalar invariance) for all groups. We performed (I) a Multi
Group Confirmative Factor Analysis (MGCFA) to establish configural invariance, (II) then
constrained factor loadings to analyze metric invariance, and finally (III) also constrained
intercepts to analyze scalar invariance, correcting for cross-loadings and with Satorra-Bentler
adjustment, and using R with the Lavaan and semTools packages.
We analyzed the results following the recommendations by Chen [64], and applying the
proposed criteria, i.e. a decline of CFI of less than .10 and an increase of RMSEA of less than
.015 when constraining the factor loadings would indicate non-invariance at this level. Subse-
quently, the Goodness of Fit should not decline more than ΔCFI -.01 and ΔRMSEA .015
when also constraining the intercepts.
Table 2. Explained variance for factor structure alternatives.














Table 3. Correlations of CCS-dimensions and indexes.
Community Personal
Honor Loyalty Hierarchy Agency Collectivism Honor Loyalty Hierarchy Agency Collectivism
Community Honor 1 .531** .568** .045 .871** .689** .369** .453** .088 .663**
Loyalty - 1 .374** .284** .747** .432** .693** .216** .324** .562**
Hierarchy - - 1 -.142** .817** .427** .225** .692** -.089 .592**
Agency - - - 1 .061 -.067 .268** -.243** .884** -.037
Collectivism - - - - 1 .637** .507** .575** .117* .746**
Personal Honor - - - - - 1 .430** .533** .003 .867**
Loyalty - - - - - - 1 .192** .320** .668**
Hierarchy - - - - - - - 1 -.183** .766**
Agency - - - - - - - - 1 .043
Collectivism - - - - - - - - - 1
Note: n: 398 (Sample 1)
*: p < .05
**: p < .01.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0185725.t003
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The MGCFA of both models confirmed acceptable fit, with CFI = .952 and RMSEA = .045
(Collective model) and CFI = .942 and RMSEA = .053 (Personal model). When constraining
factor loadings, the decline in Goodness of Fit indices met Chen’s criteria for both models:
ΔCFI was .007 for the C-model and .001 for the P-model, ΔRMSEA was .001 (C-model) and
.004 (P-model), while the χ2/df-ratio remained below 3 for both models. Further constraining
the intercepts resulted in mixed results. Criteria were met for the C-model, with ΔCFI = -.009
(total CFI = .938), ΔRMSEA = .001 (total RMSEA = .047). However, criteria were only partially
met for the P-model. Criteria for CFI were not met: ΔCFI = -.038 (total CFI = .905). Criteria
for RMSEA were met: ΔRMSEA = .013, total RMSEA = .062. Again, the χ2/df-ratio remained
below 3 for both models.
In sum, configural and metric invariance were fully confirmed, while scalar invariance was
partly. Only the decline in CFI for the P-model for scalar invariance did not meet criteria, all
other parameters suggested invariance criteria were met. Mindful of Chen’s [64] final remarks,
that these criteria should be used with caution, and the fact that CCS consists of the combina-
tion of both Collective and Personal levels, we conclude that the criteria for invariance are
largely met, and therefore the comparisons between groups based on CCS-scores reported
below, are very likely meaningful and valid.
Results: Validation
How does CCS relate to existing measures?
In order to assess the extent to which CCS can be considered distinct from a traditional mea-
sure of individualism/collectivism we assessed the correlations between the (reduced)
INDCOL95 [68] and CCS (see Table 4). Results confirm our expectations. Correlations
between INDCOL95 and the CCS subscales range from .20 (Agency Community) to .45
(Honor Personal). The ComCol index (the average of Honor, Loyalty and Hierarchy at the
Community level) and PerCol (the average of Honor, Loyalty and Hierarchy at the Personal
level) correlate respectively .48 and .51 with INDCOL’95. Therefore, we can conclude that
although CCS and INDCOL’95 converge to some extent, they also tap into distinct enough
constructs, as is to be desired from a scale that supplements an existing construct.
We also tested (in Samples 2 and 3) how CCS relates to Diener’s Subjective Life-Satisfaction
Scale [69] (5-item), and the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale [70] (10-item). We expected that
higher scores on Hierarchy (and possibly Honor) would negatively correlate with Life Satis-
faction and Self Esteem, whereas higher scores on Loyalty and Agency were expected to
positively correlate with both. We reasoned that higher degrees of Hierarchy and Honor
would constitute a stricter structure and more control and as such might limit individuals.
Table 4. Correlations between INDCOL95 and Community Collectivism subscales.
Scale CCS Loyalty Hierarchy Honor Agency
ComCol Per
Col
Com Per Com Per Com Per Com Per
INDCOL95 .48** .51** .38** .37** .38** .36** .42** .45** .20** .31**
Horizontal Collectivism .33** .39** .32** .36** .18** .19** .33** .35** .21** .30**
Vertical Collectivism .49** .59** .32** .35** .42** .49** .43** .51** -.14** -.08
Horizontal Individualism .04 -.03 .08 .04 .02 -.07 -.01 -.04 .40** .45**
Vertical Individualism .38** .35** .26** .20** .34** .29** .33** .31** .13* .24**
Note: n: 390 (Sample 1)
**: p < .01
*: p < .05. Com: Community-level, Per: Personal-level.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0185725.t004
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Conversely, a higher degree of Loyalty would imply that an individual feels more support from
his community and is inclined to return support, whereas a higher degree of Agency would
imply that the individual feels more in control of their life and fate.
The correlations between CCS subscales and these measures are presented in Table 5. What
we find, is that Self Esteem correlates weakly to moderately across all dimensions, as well as the
ComCol and PerCol indexes. The correlations with Agency Personal (r = .35, p< .001) and
Hierarchy Personal (r = -.33, p< .001) stand out however. This corresponds with our expecta-
tions: people who feel they are more in control of their fate have higher self-esteem, whereas
people who are more willing to accept a (strict) hierarchy rate themselves lower. Correlations
with Diener’s Subjective Life Satisfaction Scale are low or non-significant, but do, as expected,
point to a weak positive correlation with the Agency and Loyalty subscales. And again: higher
agency would mean a higher belief in control over one’s life and more satisfaction as a conse-
quence. A higher score on Loyalty in CCS would imply that a person is more willing to provide
and receive support, thus feeling more satisfied with life. Overall the pattern of correlations
between CCS and the measures of Self Esteem and Life Satisfaction was as expected.
Does CCS explain between-group differences?
In order to assess whether CCS distinguishes between cultural groups we compared the follow-
ing groups: Sample 1 compared indigenous Dutch and Turkish Dutch, Sample 3 compared
non-religious indigenous Dutch, orthodox-protestant indigenous Dutch, Turkish Dutch and
Hindustani Surinamese Dutch.
Comparing the means for Sample 1 (Table 6) we see that means are significantly higher for
the Turkish group than the indigenous Dutch group on three of the four subscales (Honor,
Loyalty and Hierarchy), as well as on both ComCol and PerCol. The exception is the Agency
scale, for which there is no significant difference either at individual or Community level. The
effect sizes (Cohen’s d) of the differences between both groups show that group (cultural) dif-
ferences between Dutch and Turkish are substantially larger at the Community level (see
Table 5). At the Community level the effect sizes of the first three dimensions range from 1.00
(Hierarchy) to .52 (Loyalty), whereas at the Personal level they range from .66 (Hierarchy) to
.32 (Loyalty). However, the Agency subscale again shows a different pattern: the effect size
on the Community level is .11, but the direction of the effect is reversed: the Dutch mean is
slightly higher. On the Personal-level there are virtually no cultural differences (d = .05).
Clearly Agency does not discriminate between these two groups. Importantly, the effect sizes
for CCS subscales, as well as for both indexes ComCol (1.03) and PerCol (.69) are considerably
larger than those of the (reduced) INDCOL’95 (.41 for the scale). This shows that CCS does a
much better job at discriminating cultural differences than the INDCOL’95.
We also examined whether CCS distinguishes between groups in Sample 3 (i.e., orthodox-
protestant indigenous Dutch, Turks and Hindustani-Surinamese compared to non-religious
indigenous Dutch; Table 7). Again, we found evidence that the CCS distinguishes (sub)cultural
Table 5. Correlations between Community Collectivism subscales and Self-Esteem, and Life-Satisfaction measures.





Com Per Com Per Com Per Com Per
Self Esteem -.09 -.18** .17** .15** .-.21** -.33** -.14** -.16** .17** .35**
Life Satisfaction .05 .04 .16** .17** -.03 -.05 .01 .05 .18** .16**
Note: n: 414 (Sample 3)
**: p < .01. Com: Community-level, Per: Personal-level.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0185725.t005
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Table 6. Means (SD) and effect sizes (Cohen’s d) of a priori dimensions and aggregate indexes of CCS and INDCOL’95 dimensions.
Scale Factor Level NL TR Effect Size
CCS
Honor
Community 2.83 a (.66) 3.56b (.71) .94
Personal 2.88 a (.71) 3.33b (.73) .60
Loyalty
Community 3.33 a (.59) 3.66b (.63) .52
Personal 3.54 a (.58) 3.74b (.64) .32
Hierarchy
Community 2.44 a (.70) 3.23b (.64) 1.00
Personal 2.46 a (.66) 2.93b (.70) .66
Agency
Community 3.99 a (.48) 3.93a (.60) -.11
Personal 3.77 a (.47) 3.80a (.56) .05
ComCol 2.87 a (.49) 3.48b (.53) 1.03
PerCol 2.96 a (.48) 3.34b (.54) .69
INDCOL
IndCol 3.21a (.37) 3.37b (.41) .41
Horizontal Collectivism 3.41a (.53) 3.51a (.51) .19
Vertical Collectivism 2.83a (.56) 3.08b (.64) .41
Horizontal Individualism 3.55a (.61) 3.58a (.67) .05
Vertical Individualism 3.10a (.66) 3.36b (.56) .41
Note: NL: indigenous Dutch (n: 215), TR: of Turkish descent (n: 183); Negative effect sizes indicate that indigenous Dutch mean is higher than mean of
participants of Turkish descent. Subscripts with different indices differ at (p < .05)
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0185725.t006
Table 7. CCS means and effect sizes of non-religious Dutch vs other groups on Community Collectivism Scale.
Factor Level Non-religious Dutch prot. Dutch Turks Hindustani
M (SD) M (SD) Effect Size M (SD) Effect Size M (SD) Effect Size
Honor
Community 2.82 (.74) 3.08** (.70) .35 3.51** (.71) .93 3.35** (.75) .78
Personal 2.86 (.75) 3.01 (.72) .20 3.32** (.76) .62 3.14** (.79) .38
Loyalty
Community 3.33 (.54) 3.66** (.59) .61 3.74** (.73) .75 3.63** (.78) .55
Personal 3.43 (.66) 3.83** (.58) .60 3.76** (.75) .50 3.65* (.76) .32
Hierarchy
Community 2.34 (.85) 2.41 (.78) .09 3.22** (.80) 1.04 3.12** (.84) .92
Personal 2.26 (.86) 2.48* (.76) .25 2.93** (.97) .78 2.66** (.77) .46
Agency
Community 3.83 (.63) 3.45** (.63) -.59 3.53** (.72) -.47 3.57** (.62) -.40
Personal 4.12 (.64) 3.90** (.51) -.35 3.86** (.69) -.41 4.15 (.72) .04
ComCol 2.82 (.56) 3.04** (.49) .39 3.48** (.60) 1.17 3.38** (.61) 1.00
PerCol 2.85 (.57) 3.11** (.48) .45 3.32** (.60) .83 3.16** (.58) .55
Note: Mean difference significance is indicated by *: p < .05 and **: p < .01; Cohen’s D effect size with non-religious indigenous Dutch (n = 118) as
reference group (mean and sd) versus orthodox-protestant indigenous Dutch (n = 116), of Turkish descent (n = 81) and of Hindustani Surinamese descent
(n = 107); Negative effect sizes indicate that non-religious indigenous Dutch mean is higher than mean of participants of compared group.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0185725.t007
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groups well. For the Turkish and Hindustani-Surinamese the largest differences were, as in
Sample 1, found for Hierarchy and Honor. Not unexpectedly, the pattern of results differed
somewhat for the orthodox-protestants where greatest differences were found for Loyalty and
the Community level of Agency.
We note that although Agency did not discriminate between indigenous Dutch versus
Turkish Dutch in Sample 1, our findings for Sample 3 suggest that this dimension does
uncover group-cultural differences in general. Apparently, the groups compared in Sample 1
(indigenous Dutch and Dutch of Turkish descent) happen to share similar values with regard
to this dimension.
Overall, we can conclude that CCS discriminates very well between cultural groups (indige-
nous Dutch compared to Turkish and Hindustani-Surinamese), as well as between sub-cul-
tural groups (non-religious indigenous Dutch compared to orthodox protestant indigenous
Dutch), and across all dimensions.
What behaviors does CCS predict?
We assessed whether CCS’s predicts attitudes and behaviors with 20 scenarios (two in Sample
1, 18 in Samples 2 and 3) in which cultural differences were expected to surface. The scenarios
were devised following the expectation that higher scores on Loyalty, Hierarchy and Honor
would predict behaviors and attitudes prioritizing group interests versus personal interests.
We expected that Agency would predict the opposite. The rationale behind these expectations
was that cultural orientations should show in such everyday events that touch on social rela-
tions. Within the context of CCS, the value domains of Loyalty, Hierarchy and Honor have the
function to regulate the community. Scoring higher on these values, should therefore predict
attitudes and behaviors that reflect prioritizing group interests above personal interests. While
Agency is not the opposite of this, scoring higher on this dimension may predict attitudes
reflecting greater margins for individual ‘deviation’. However, as Agency also includes an ele-
ment of ‘greater personal responsibility’, we expected that the outcomes with regard to this
value domain could turn out less straightforward than the outcomes with regard to the other
three value domains.
We developed 18 short scenarios (all scenarios and analyses are available from the first
author) in Samples 2 and 3 that were centered on the CCS-dimensions and on possible trans-
gressions of the underlying cultural values, both in a neutral social context and in a context
that involved medical or psychosocial healthcare. Furthermore, we were interested in explor-
ing how participants thought their close relatives would act. Participants were presented with
three possible responses that were formulated to be either increasingly prioritizing group inter-
ests, or increasingly prioritizing individual interests. An example of a scenario would be: ‘Since
your father in-law passed away, your mother in-law lives with you and your partner. This has
given rise to some tensions, for which you have sought counseling. Your therapist advises you to
ask your mother in-law to consider moving to an assisted living facility.’ The possible answers
were: ‘(a) You don’t think that is an option. (b) You talk this through with your partner. (c)You
ask your mother in-law to consider this.’ In this case, we also asked participants to assess what
they would think other members of their community would do, when faced with the same sce-
nario. We expected those dimensions that are central at the Community level (i.e., Honor,
Hierarchy, Loyalty) to be related to a prioritization of group over individual interest. By con-
trast, we hypothesized that Agency would lead to prioritization of individual over group
interests.
We combined the 17 scenarios, after recoding in the ‘group priority’ direction where this
was necessary, to one mean variable ‘Scenarios’. We then performed three separate sets of
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multiple regression analyses, testing four models: the first model (and the first step of all three
analyses) specified the cultural identity categories as sole independent variable category. With
the second model, we added ComCol (mean of communal levels of Loyalty, Honor and Hier-
archy) plus Communal Agency (Com_Ag) in the second step, whereas in the third model Per-
Col (mean of personal levels of Loyalty, Honor and Hierarchy) and Agency at the personal
level (Per_Ag) were added. Finally, in the fourth model we added both ComCol and PerCol, as
well as Agency at both levels. The results are shown in Table 8.
What becomes apparent, is that in all cases the addition of CCS(-sub scales) leads to a sig-
nificant rise in explained variance: both ComCol and PerCol predict behavioral intentions.
The addition of CCS does not fully mediate the behavioral intentions for Turks and Hindu-
stani Surinamese, but it does for the protestant Dutch. As expected, values we consider central
to the community (Loyalty, Hierarchy, Honor) are related to greater prioritization of group
interest, whereas Agency is related to prioritization of individual interest. Results also revealed
that behavioral intentions with regard to the scenarios are best predicted by the values at the
personal level (PerCol and Per_Ag). This is not wholly unexpected as most scenarios (13 of the
17 scenarios we administered) were concerning individual behavioral intentions. We therefore
separately combined and analyzed the individual scenarios (13) and scenarios that concerned
the behaviors of other community members (four scenarios, see Table 9). The analyses con-
firmed that in scenarios in which participants were asked to estimate what their family mem-
bers would do, values at the communal level were more potent predictors. This is in line with
our predictions that people judge the actions of their community members on the basis of
what they perceive as the values of that community and not per se on the basis of their personal
values.
Table 8. Regression analysis: Behavioral intentions predicted by cultural identity and CCS.



























Protestant .097 (.031) .166** .055 (.032) .096 -.050 (.031) -.085 .040 (.032) .069
Turkish .205 (.034) .321** .135 (.036) .211** .083 (.033) .128* .120 (.037) .184**
Hindustani
Sur.
.186 (.031) .318** .126 (.033) .215** .098 (.031) .166** .128 (.034) .217**
CCS
ComCol .095 (.020) .230** .056 (.030) .134†
Com_Ag -.038 (.018) -.100* -.006 (.020) -.016
PerCol .123 (.020) .275** .078 (.029) .178**
Per_Ag -.062 (.018) -.153** -.060 (.021) -.148**
R2 (Δ) .10** .16**(.053**) .19**(.093**) .20**(.094**)
N 458 433 442 420
Note: Cultural identity represented as three dummy variables with non-religious Dutch as reference group; ComCol (mean of Honor, Loyalty and Hierarchy
at Community level), PerCol (mean of Honor, Loyalty and Hierarchy at Personal level), Com_Ag (Agency at Community level) and Per_Ag (Agency at
Personal level) centered at their means.; ΔR2 is expressed relative to Model 1.
†: .1< p < .05
*: p < .05
**: p < .01
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0185725.t008
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In order to further assess differences between groups with respect to loyalty towards
extended family, we used a scenario in which the respondent’s grandparents were advised (by
a doctor) to admit themselves to residential nursing care. Note that in this case (Sample 1) we
only assessed differences between Dutch and Turkish Dutch. Participants were then presented
four items regarding their attitudes towards formalized care (which we considered to be the
more individualistic approach) versus care by family members (considered to be the collectiv-
ist approach). These items were combined in a scale reflecting endorsement of family care
(e.g., ‘I think it is a disgrace if elderly people are placed in a nursery home while they still have
family that could provide care’; α = .74). Item scores ranged from 1 (totally disagree) to 5
(totally agree). Analysis of variance revealed significant effects such that participants of Turk-
ish (M = 3.07, SD = .76) compared to those of indigenous Dutch descent (M = 2.38, SD = .66)
showed higher endorsement of family care, F (1, 389) = 91.76, p< .001; partial η2 = .19. We
then determined whether the attitudes ranging from endorsement of formalized care (low
score) to endorsement of family care (high score) can be significantly predicted by CCS, using
regression analysis. We entered ComCol, PerCol and Agency at both levels as independent
variables. ComCol, PerCol, Com_Ag and Per_Ag explained about 27% of the variance (R2 =
.27, F(4,388) = 16.32, p< .001). For a direct comparison, we also examined to what degree
INDCOL95 predicted responses on this scenario. The INDCOL95 sub-dimensions (Horizon-
tal Collectivism, Vertical Collectivism, Horizontal Individualism and Vertical Individualism)
explained considerably less variance: R2 = .07, F(4,385) = 7.31, p< .001).
We can conclude that CCS predicts behavioral intentions well. For one, ComCol and Per-
Col predict behavioral intentions that prioritize group interests, whereas Personal and Com-
munal Agency predict prioritizing personal interests. Moreover, communal level scores better
predicted scenarios regarding behavior of community members, whereas personal level scores
better predicted behavioral intentions in scenarios that related to individual level behaviors.
Taken together these results further underline the importance of measuring values central to
communities (and the individual) both at the community and the personal level.
Table 9. Regression analysis: Individual behavioral intentions and those of other community members predicted by cultural identity and CCS.











Protestant .009 (.049) .011 .044 (.037) .066
Turkish .257 (.057) .267** .096 (.043) .129*
Hindustani Sur. .065 (.052) .075 .154 (.039) .230**
CCS
ComCol .111 (.046) .179* .042 (.035) .088
Com_Ag .051 (.032) .087 -.019 (.024) -.043
PerCol -.004 (.045) -.007 .097 (.034) .193**
Per_Ag -.051 (.033) -.086 -.064 (.025) -.139**
R2 .13** .17**
N 419 420
Note: Cultural identity represented as three dummy variables with non-religious Dutch as reference group; ComCol (mean of Honor, Loyalty and Hierarchy
at Community level), PerCol (mean of Honor, Loyalty and Hierarchy at Personal level), Com_Ag (Agency at Community level) and Per_Ag (Agency at
Personal level) centered at their means.
*: p < .05
**: p < .01.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0185725.t009
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Does CCS predict actual behavior over time?
In order to consider whether CCS predicts actual behavior over time, we re-sampled a popula-
tion 1.5 years after they had completed the CCS scale as part of an unrelated study on collective
action (in relation to CCS). Since measuring CCS at time 1 (March 2014), there had been
national elections in Turkey (June 2015) and we wanted to assess whether CCS (measured 1.5
years beforehand), would affect voting behavior, as a means of affirming predictive validity of
CCS. Note that Turkey is a good country to conduct such a study since it contains a mixture of
modern and traditional subgroups which are divided not just geographically (e.g., city vs. coun-
tryside) but also politically. We predicted that higher scores on Loyalty, Hierarchy and Honor
(as expressed in the means ComCol and PerCol) would predict voting for one of the conserva-
tive parties. The rationale behind this expectation was that higher scores on ComCol and PerCol
would constitute more traditional community values, and since these traditional values were
espoused by the conservative AK party of Erdogan, this should result in voting conservatively.
In November 2015, we asked participants if, and for what party, they had voted in the Turk-
ish national elections of June 2015. 111 participants (Mage = 39.4, 49 women and 62 men) took
part both at time 1 (March 2014; measurement of CCS) and time 2 (November 2015, measure-
ment of voting behavior). Participants were provided with a choice between the five main par-
ties (Ak Parti, CHP, MHP, HDP and SP/BBP, for which 79% of the sample had voted) or for
‘other’ parties, not voting and blank voting (21%). We expected CCS to predict a choice for a
Conservative (Ak Parti, MHP and SP/BBP) vs. Progressive party (CHP and HDP). We recoded
the voting behavior into a dichotomous variable. Voters who did not vote, or did not vote for a
conservative or progressive party were considered ‘missing’ values (n = 23).
We conducted a logistic regression analysis with the (dichotomous) voting behavior as the
dependent variable and ComCol, PerCol, Com_Ag and Per_Ag as predictors. A test of the full
model against a constant-only model proved statistically significant (χ2 = 12,444, p = .014,
df = 4). The overall explained variance was (Nagelkerke’s) R2 = .177, while ComCol proved the
only significant predictor (Wald = 4.849, p = .028). The odds ratios, Exp(B) = 3.265, indicated
that a one point higher score on ComCol raises the chance the respondents vote for a conser-
vative party more than threefold, confirming our predictions.
Importantly, the present study reveals that CCS can predict voting behavior over time–
behavior that is quite consequential also at the national level. Moreover, this study once again
affirms the ability of CCS to predict within country differences such as a preference for conser-
vative versus liberal parties.
How does CCS relate to social networks?
Differences in attitudes towards one’s family group are one of the central distinctions between
collectivistic and individualistic cultures [34]. Family is considered a more integral part of
one’s group and self-concept in collectivistic compared to individualistic cultures. We there-
fore assessed to what extent CCS can predict attitudes with respect to social networks (Sample
1). We expected that higher CCS scores would be related to feelings of proximity towards fam-
ily but not friends or colleagues. This is consistent with the group differences we also expected
to find: Turkish group would report more proximity towards family, whereas the Dutch were
expected to report more proximity with non-relatives (as well).
Participants responded to the question (‘State for the following people how close they are to
you: mother; father; brother; sister; grandparents; life partner; best friend; friends; colleagues;
boss’) by moving a slider between 1 (‘Very distant’) and 10 (‘Very close’). The items ‘mother’,
‘father’, ‘brother’, ‘sister’ and ‘grandparents’ were combined into a new measure of perceived
Closeness to Kin, while ‘life partner’, ‘best friend’ and ‘friends’ were combined into Closeness
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to Friends, and ‘colleagues’ and ‘boss’ were combined into Closeness to Work, thus delineating
three segments of social network. Participants were asked to fill in an answer even when the
question did not fully apply to them. They were asked to imagine what they would think in the
given situation.
We found expected group differences such that Closeness to Kin was significantly higher
for the Turkish group, while Closeness to Friends was significantly higher for the Dutch
group. For Closeness to Work there were no group differences. More importantly, a hierarchi-
cal regression analysis shows that CCS significantly predicts Closeness to Kin: R2 = .22, F(8,
382) = 13.49, p< .001, and the addition of the dummy-coded cultural group to the model does
not significantly add to the amount of explained variance. In other words, Community Collec-
tivism explains the bulk of the differences between cultural groups on the topic of closeness to
family members. With respect to Closeness to Friends, CCS dimensions predict R2 = .07,
F(8,382) = 3.70, p< .001, while the addition of cultural group slightly adds to the amount of
explained variance (ΔR2 = .045, p< .05). For Closeness to Work, the proportion of variance
explained by CCS is slightly smaller: R2 = .05, F(8,382) = 2.71, p< .01. Adding cultural group
accounts for an additional ΔR2 = .042 (p< .05). We conclude that Community Collectivism is
a good predictor of closeness to social relations within one’s personal network.
Value discrepancy: Are there differences between the Community and
Personal levels?
There is reason to believe that individuals might report differences between their individually
held beliefs and the beliefs and values of others in their culture (cf. [1]). We were interested in
exploring these differences: experienced discrepancies between ones personally held beliefs
and those perceived within one’s community might induce a ‘value dissociation’ and be related
to lower levels of well-being.
We found differences between responses on Community and Personal levels across all cul-
tural groups in samples 1 and 2. Interestingly, although we find an overall C-P discrepancy,
there are considerable variations in the magnitude of this discrepancy depending on the cul-
tural group (Table 10). The general difference across all four dimensions, termed Value Dis-
crepancy, is not significant for indigenous groups, whereas they are for the Turkish and
Hindustani-Surinamese groups. In the latter two groups, which are traditionally considered to
be more interdependent, the communal level of Hierarchy and Honor are perceived as signifi-
cantly higher than the individual levels. However, there is a different C-P discrepancy for the
dimension of agency: in all cultural groups individuals consider themselves to be more ‘agen-
tic’ than their community.
Table 10. Value discrepancy: CCS differences between Community and Personal levels.
Communal level minus Personal level
Cultural Identity Loyalty Honor Hierarchy Agency Value Discrepancy
Non-religious -.11* -.04 .08 -.31** -.04
Protestant -.15** .07 -.06 -.45** -.05
Turkish -.05 .19** .29** -.34** .13*
Hindustani Sur. -.03 .22** .45** -.60** .21**
Full sample -.09** .10** .17** -.43** .05*
Note: N = 465
*: p < .05
**: p < .01; Value Discrepancy: Community level score minus Personal level score.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0185725.t010
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In order to explore whether the discrepancy between personal and community values is
experienced as problematic, we considered correlations between Value Discrepancy, life satis-
faction [69] and self-esteem [70]. Unexpectedly, there were no significant correlations with life
satisfaction. In addition, self-esteem correlations with difference scores tended to be inconsis-
tent and small (even though the large sample size meant that some were statistically signifi-
cant). In sum, the results show that the participants can and do distinguish between individual
and communal values, which implies that intersubjective measures are qualitatively distinct
from personal level measures. However, dissociations between the two levels have no straight-
forward association with life satisfaction and self-esteem.
General discussion
The main aim of this research was to develop a reliable operationalization of culture that
would differentiate between different cultural groups, and predict attitudes and behaviors. As
our results reveal, out of a large pool of items we developed a relatively compact scale, the CCS,
which meets all these criteria.
We built our scale on the premise that culture is maintained within people’s social networks
and the communities that people are part of. These communities, we argued, shape both the
types of values people adhere to (i.e., values that are relevant to and maintain communities), as
well as determining the level at which culture should be measured (i.e., at the individual and
community level). Taking a group dynamic approach, we identified three processes that serve
to uphold long-term (group) relationships: the maintenance of group loyalty, of a within-
group hierarchy, and of a system of honor by which group members may regulate adherence
to certain standards and norms. We also expected individuals to be motivated to maintain a
level of personal autonomy vis-à-vis their communities. For this reason, the fourth value
assessed was agency. Importantly, we assessed these values at both at the individual and the
Community level in four separate samples.
Analysis of scale factor structure confirmed the hypothesized two-level, four-factor struc-
ture. Three factors (loyalty, hierarchy and honor) were found to be highly correlated, and
could be considered components of a general factor related to group dynamical mechanisms
of social regulation—collectivism in other words. The fourth factor, agency (more closely
related to individualism), was separate. Each of these factors has good psychometric properties
and adequate reliability. This is particularly important because other measures of individual-
ism/collectivism have not always achieved this objective.
The results further showed that CCS could detect sizable differences between cultural
groups, both at the Communal and the Personal level. Differentiation between cultural groups
was very good in particular for the collectivist dimensions Hierarchy and Honor, as well as for
Loyalty. These differences were shown for direct comparisons between indigenous Dutch ver-
sus Turkish Dutch (Samples 1 and 2), and between indigenous “secular” Dutch, indigenous
strict-protestant Dutch, Dutch of Turkish descent and of Hindustani-Surinamese descent.
Notably, the between-group differences tended to be descriptively larger at the Communal
level than at the Personal level. There was one exception to this: for orthodox Christians, col-
lective level effects were somewhat smaller, possibly because these communities are more inte-
grated with secular Dutch communities. We conclude that, across the board, Community
Collectivism is better at detecting between-group differences than the personal-level measure
of collectivism.
Furthermore, the dimensions of Community Collectivism not only differentiate between
groups that are generally considered to be very different cultures (e.g., Turkish, Hindustani-
Surinamese and native Dutch), but also between other subcultural groups within Dutch society
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which are more subtly different (strict-protestant indigenous Dutch). This suggests we man-
aged to measure cultural values with a relatively high degree of precision.
By contrast, the agency dimension (which is more individualist in nature) did not differen-
tiate between cultural groups in some instances. This is an intriguing finding: it suggests that
one of the reasons why previous work on individualism/collectivism may have struggled to
find robust between-culture differences is that it failed to differentiate among psychometrically
different dimensions of Ind/Col. It also confirms prior suggestions that individualism and col-
lectivism should not be considered opposite ends of one continuum, but should instead be
studied as separate dimensions [44, 34].
Finally, CCS at the communal and personal level predicted behavioral intentions as well as
actual behaviors. We tested behavioral intentions and attitudes with a range of scenarios
touching on themes such as medical and psychosocial healthcare, family values, and personal
freedom, and tested behaviors with regard to voting. Across these themes, CCS boosted the
explained variance significantly or proved a potent predictor by itself. More specifically, com-
munal level scores better predicted scenarios regarding behaviors of community members,
whereas personal level scores better predicted behavioral intentions for scenarios in which
individual behaviors were targeted. At both levels, our scale was a stronger determinant of
these intentions than the reduced INDCOL95.
Importantly, CCS also proved a potent predictor of behavior over time: CCS predicted vot-
ing behavior 14 months after it was administered. Indeed, a 1 point higher score on ComCol
was found to raise the chances of voting for a conservative part by threefold. These findings
also speak to CCS’ ability to predict within country differences in actual behavior. We feel this
provides strong evidence for the predictive validity of CCS.
In sum, CCS (consisting of two subscales ComCol and Percol) is a valuable and distinctive
empirical contribution. The empirical value of CCS becomes apparent in comparison with estab-
lished measures of individualism/collectivism such as INDCOL. This measure has raised various
methodological concerns of reliability, measurement invariance and (content) validity (e.g., [9, 16,
71–73]). Notably, it has been suggested that validity of INDCOL may be improved by “situating”
the measure in a specific context or reference group (e.g., [65, 74]). The current findings support
this suggestion. Additionally, the content of CCS (i.e., the 4 dimensions) are closely tied to the
functions of these values for the community. In this way, CCS extends and refines the concepts of
Individualism and Collectivism, as evidenced by the convergent validity with INDCOL95. More
precisely, the value domains of loyalty, hierarchy and honor, are mechanisms that regulate the
interests of the group, whereas the value domain of agency is aimed at regulating the margins for
individuality. These two axes are similar to what Kağıtc¸ıbaşı (e.g., [44]) calls relatedness and au-
tonomy. The combination of content and form of CCS makes that, compared with INDCOL’95,
CCS has superior reliability, superior ability to differentiate between cultural groups and superior
predictive validity, at the personal level but particularly at the Community level.
Theoretical implications
The central conclusion of the empirical work is that CCS is a reliable operationalization of
community-based cultural differences, as well as an effective predictor of behavioral conse-
quences. The empirical effectiveness of CCS stems from the conceptual analysis that underpins
it, we believe. CCS is not just another attempt to operationalize cultural values. CCS operatio-
nalizes what we see as the twin core ingredients of the cultural process within communities:
the values and cultural preferences within individual minds (as operationalized by many oth-
ers, e.g., [8]) matter as much as the social dynamics between community members within
which they develop, are activated and expressed (this paper).
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A distinctive approach to intersubjectivity. CCS operationalizes this cultural dynamic by
tapping into community members’ perceptions of others’ values and practices. In this, our
approach builds on the intersubjective approach to culture [1, 75–77] and further corroborates
the merits of this approach. Our research does shed some new light on the issue at what level
intersubjective norms are best measured. Fischer [17] has shown that the consensus with
regard to most intersubjective norms tended to be fairly low—so low in fact that it seemed
unjustified to claim that these are shared representation of values. But most work on intersub-
jective norms has hitherto examined norms that are shared nationally. The present work not
only shows that the operationalization of intersubjectivity within community settings has
merit, we are also able to explain why there is strong within-nation difference between cultural
groups: We are able to demonstrate large differences between subcultural groups (with a
median effect size of d = 1.02). CCS was also able to detect differences between ethnic Dutch
groups with different community structure (due to religious orientation) and within Turkish
society, where there is a long-standing division between traditional and secular lifestyles that
can be witnessed in many other Muslim societies. The presence of sizable between-community
differences suggests that it may be fruitful to not just focus on the Nation or on large social cat-
egories, but rather to operationalize culture at the level at which it is done: within smaller,
more homogeneous, subcultural communities.
Our focus on the social dynamics within communities also informed what values we ex-
pected to be most influential within the community context. Most intersubjective approaches
to cultural values have translated the idea of shared or communal meaning into a distinction
into different types of reference groups (e.g., the self versus groups people think are central in
their culture, [5]). We propose that a consequence of intersubjectivity is that we need to mea-
sure those values that are likely to be functional at the level at which they are shared and oper-
ate. Thus, cultural values that are central to intragroup processes in close-knit communities
(i.e., Loyalty, Hierarchy, Honor), should be recognized to exist at exactly that Community
level and should (as our results confirm) predict cultural differences and behavior within those
communities. It is for future research to test the corollary of these predictions, that these cul-
tural values are less clearly defined at other levels of abstraction (such as the national level) and
that they fail to predict behaviors outside of the community context. Moreover, future work
on intersubjectivity may adopt a similar approach to ours by asking what types of values would
be most relevant to National groups, social categories or groups at any other level of social
abstraction.
A distinctive approach to values. CCS assumes that cultural values fulfill a function for the
community. In this, our approach builds on Schwartz’ idea that values have functions for indi-
vidual, biological as well as social reasons (e.g., [3]). But Schwartz approaches this issue from
the perspective of the individual: it builds a catalogue of possible values that an individual can
hold. Our focus is more situated and focused on the systemic characteristics and dynamics
within communities. This leads to marked differences in operationalization: CCS explicitly
defines the ‘social other’ as an ingroup member and incorporates only the values and practices
directly relevant to the cultural (group) process. Moreover, CCS operationalizes these concepts
intersubjectively. CCS is thus different conceptually and empirically; there is limited overlap
with Schwartz’ SVS.
To illustrate this with some examples from the scales themselves, the SVS asks respondents
to rate values (e.g., honouring of parents and elders; showing respect) for their importance “as
a guiding principle in my life”. CCS measures values by reference to the community as well as
the individual (e.g., item #2 for measuring honor at the community level: ‘In my community,
honor is the most important thing for people’). But CCS also measures the practices and beliefs
through which these values are maintained (e.g., items 3 and 4 of the same subscale: Our
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community monitors if people observe the unwritten rules; In my community, members of
the family feel responsible for preserving and protecting another family member’s honor). In
all, this makes CCS a scale which is more descriptive of how hierarchy, honor, loyalty and
agency are done within the community. By contrast, Schwartz’ approach is most interested in
how individuals see themselves across a broader circle of values.
Applications of CCS. Beyond the ability to distinguish between cultural groups, the present
research offers some perspectives on possible applications. One of these was that we had
expected and hoped to use CCS as a method for examining value conflict. Several previous
studies have found a discrepancy between personal and cultural values (cf. [1]). The current
research also finds highly variable differences between communal and personal levels (ranging
from large to almost zero), and we expected these discrepancies to be meaningful and conse-
quential; we measured self-esteem and life satisfaction to explore this. But on this point the
results were clear, consistent and negative: the magnitude of discrepancy between personal
and social values was largely unrelated to measures of life satisfaction and self esteem. Future
research might delve deeper into the meaning and consequences of these discrepancies. It
could be that they only become problematic in contexts where value discrepancies produce
actual relational conflicts, but that integrating the complexities of such discrepancies is a task
that humans are normally well equipped for (cf. [78, 79]).
With respect to the implications of CCS for within- and cross-community behavior, there
are several practical implications of this research. It is rather obvious that CCS should regulate
behavior within communities—future work should certainly focus on the ways in which Com-
Col and PerCol interact in doing so. But our scenarios were also designed to probe the conse-
quences of community collectivism for cross-community behavior. In particular, we designed
scenarios to speak to problems of intercultural adaptation and communication within health-
care settings. To give one concrete example: in one of our scenarios, participants were asked to
consider whether they would ask their mother in-law, who recently lost her spouse and who
lived with the participants’ family from that moment on, to move to a home for the elderly.
We found that the behavioral intentions for this scenario were strongly predicted by CCS
(both at Community and Personal levels) because this scenario presents a dilemma between
the within-community collective demands of certain groups and the incompatible services
offered by the Dutch healthcare system. Our assessment of behavioral intentions in this
domain confirms that the value that certain cultural minority groups attach to their commu-
nity and, more specifically, to honor, loyalty and hierarchy, may prevent them from accepting
healthcare services. This may help healthcare professionals understand why certain cultural
groups consistently underuse certain healthcare services (which in the Netherlands are paid
for by every taxpayer and thus should be equally accessible to all). More broadly, our scale can
inform thinking about systemic interventions, taking into account norms and values of cul-
tural communities as well as the choices of individual clients.
Finally, the behavioral implications of CCS for voting behavior in Turkey point to another
implication. The basic values cultivated within communities may be politically consequential
at the national level. We confirmed that higher scores on CCS, specifically the domains of
ComCol (Loyalty, Hierarchy and Honor) predicted voting for conservative parties. This we
explain by the fact that the collectivistic ‘family values’ within communities are propagated, in
Turkey, by several conservative parties. But although a priori we would have predicted both
components of CCS to be good predictors, empirically ComCol was a stronger predictor. The
implication is clear: political parties may profit from knowing the relational dynamics within
communities: the values and practices within them might be as relevant (or more) than the
individual values of voters. More broadly, this result points to new avenues for cross-cultural
research: intra-cultural variability (in the form of between-community differences within the
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same overarching culture) is predictive of consequential forms of individual behavior directed
at the national level.
Limitations
Although we were able to predict attitudes towards social networks such as family, friends and
work as well as behavioral intentions regarding for example formalized healthcare, not all of
the scenarios we used to assess differences in cultural behaviors showed significant effects. We
think that the effect sizes in tests of predictive validity were substantially reduced by the fact
that participants were presented with three choices, of which the middle option, which was
generally nuanced and common sense, proved the most appealing for the large majority.
We also note that the studies reported in this paper, although focusing on a wide range of
different cultural groups, assess the scale in one language and one overarching cultural setting
(the Netherlands). The paper does report one study conducted in Turkey which shows the
scale to be useful in that context and language, too. Moreover, although not reported in this
paper, the Turkish translation of the scale has a similar factor structure and we are hopeful that
its validity can be generalized across other cultural groups and languages in the future.
Relatedly, the measurement invariance of the scale should be tested further. The Commu-
nity level scale demonstrated scalar invariance, meaning that it is meaningful to compare the
means on this scale across subcultural groups. The Personal level scale met all criteria for the
metric level of invariance, two of the criteria for scalar invariance (RMSEA and the χ2/df-ratio)
but not the third criterion (decrease of Comparative Fit Index). Given the fact that CCS con-
sists of both, we think that measurement invariance of CCS was largely confirmed. However, it
is possible that measurement invariance can be further improved in future research, possibly
by adding or changing items at the Personal level.
Conclusions
The Community Collectivism Scale provides a means to meaningfully and reliably discrimi-
nate between subcultural groups. We provided evidence that the CCS can explain part of the
inter-cultural variance in particular behavioral choices, and thus conclude that the CCS allows
us to better study inter-cultural variability. These cultural values are of immediate relevance
for the regulation of the behavior of individuals in their direct community environment.
Importantly, the content of these familial values is also relevant for societal values, and as such
relate to how individuals and communities think that society as a whole should function. The
present research suggests that CCS will prove to be a fruitful lens through which to understand
differences in community values both within and between cultures. But more broadly, we
believe that the empirical effectiveness of CCS offers a different perspective on the importance
of studying the cultural dynamic within communities: the objective should be to study culture
as it manifests itself in individual minds as well in tandem with how culture is done. In sum,
CCS has much to offer to the fields of cultural and cross-cultural psychology.
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